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In this paper, I use a Wilberian integral futures approach to examine visions of the future within 
the climate action movement and identify sources of agreement and contention. I argue that the 
Wilberian approach is particularly valuable in drawing out diverse futures associated with 
differing levels of consciousness. Applying this approach to the climate action movement, I 
identify a likely future in which the continued promotion of a particular set of ecological values 
limits the appeal of the movement and reduces its effectiveness. An alternative future sees 
movement leaders working from or adopting more diverse value positions to develop movement 
visions that have broader appeal and support more effective results. 
 




Sustainability is an inherently future-oriented concept. The unsustainable trajectory of current 
human practices only becomes evident when we project the consequences of those practices into 
the future. Application of foresight demonstrates that human civilisation is on a pathway that 
leads to exhaustion of natural resources, destruction of ecosystems, economic collapse and social 
and cultural decline (Slaughter, 2004). When we look to the future, we see a path that cannot be 
sustained without very undesirable consequences for humans and other species. 
While foresight reveals the dangers of our present path, it also provides a map of a broader future 
territory. Using foresight, we can imagine and explore pathways towards desirable futures, and 
work to realise those futures. The key question for both futurists and sustainability practitioners 
is what kind of future, or futures, do we collectively desire? What type of civilisation do we want 
to sustain into the future? What practices do we wish to retain and what new practices should we 
develop? What values sit at the heart of a sustainable civilisation? 
The answers to these questions vary because human values and perspectives vary. Developmental 
psychologists have demonstrated that there are distinct value stages and worldviews that humans 
move through in the course of their interior development (e.g. Cook-Greuter, 2004; Esbjörn-
Hargens & Zimmerman, 2009; Kegan, 1982; Wilber, 2000). People think, feel and interpret the 
world differently and have different visions of a sustainable human civilisation. We all try, 
consciously or unconsciously, to project our own values into the future and create futures that 
reflect those values. This is the politics of the future, a clash of ideologies and perspectives. It is 
therefore crucial that work in sustainability and futures studies is aware of multiple perspectives 
and how those perspectives translate into different desired futures. 
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Futures practitioners can draw on several holistic or integrative approaches to futures inquiry that 
explicitly recognise and respect plural perspectives and explore the implications of these 
perspectives for probable, possible and preferable futures (e.g. Gidley, 2010; Inayatullah, 2010; 
Ramos, 2010; Slaughter, 2004, 2008a; Voros, 2008). In this paper, I use a specific integral futures 
approach that draws on Ken Wilber’s integral theory (e.g. Wilber, 2000, 2001, 2007a, 2007b) to 
explore futures of the movement for action on climate change. 
Climate change has become the preeminent sustainability issue, receiving significantly more 
political, corporate, media and public attention than the other pressing environmental and social 
issues that humans face. Around the world, a diverse movement has emerged calling for stronger 
action to respond to climate change. However, this movement lacks cohesion and has failed to 
build sufficient political power to trigger the technological, economic and socio-cultural 
transformations required to substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Shellenberger & 
Nordhaus, 2004). 
Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, p.32) argue that the inability of the climate action movement 
to achieve greater traction can be attributed to its failure to articulate ‘a set of core beliefs, 
principles, or values’. They argue that the movement can build its political momentum and 
broaden its support by identifying and communicating a core set of values, developing a 
compelling alternative vision for society, and outlining a pathway for achieving that vision. 
However, as Hulme (2009, p.xxvi) points out, disagreements about climate change run deep and 
reveal ‘our different attitudes to risk, technology and well-being; our different ethical, ideological 
and political beliefs; our different interpretations of the past and our competing visions of the 




To explore this question, I use a Wilberian integral futures approach to examine future visions 
within the climate action movement and identify sources of agreement and contention. I have 
two main objectives: 
• To identify ways in which the climate action movement can become more effective and 
contribute towards the realisation of sustainable and desirable futures 
• To investigate the practical value of integral approaches for futures practitioners. 
The climate action movement 
When I refer to the climate action movement, I use the term ‘movement’ in the sense used by 
Paul Hawken in his book Blessed Unrest (Hawken, 2007). Hawken writes about an emerging 
environmental and social justice movement that does not fit the standard model of a movement. 
It ‘is dispersed, inchoate, and fiercely independent. It has no manifesto or doctrine, no overriding 
authority to check with’ (Hawken, 2007, p.3). It is nameless, is not bound together by any single 
issue, disagrees about as much as it agrees about, involves many different types of organisations 
and diverse individuals and is emerging from the bottom up. 
The climate action movement is a more narrowly defined subset of Hawken’s environmental and 
social justice movement, loosely bound by a desire for more effective social responses to climate 
change. Despite their common interest in climate action, the diverse organisations and 
individuals that make up the climate action movement hold different opinions on what 
constitutes an effective social response to climate change and how to achieve such a response. 
The climate action movement has no central organisation but is a shifting conglomeration of 
concerned individuals, non-government organisations (NGOs), progressive businesses and some 
governments or government agencies. Although dominated by environmental interests, the 
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climate action movement increasingly includes social justice groups, the labour and workforce 
rights movement, faith groups, charitable institutions and the aid and development sector. 
The Wilberian integral futures approach 
As noted above, there are diverse holistic or integrative approaches to futures inquiry. In a 2010 
special issue of Futures edited by Sohail Inayatullah (2010), the contributors demonstrate the 
breadth of integral futures approaches. The specific Wilberian integral futures approach emerged 
over the last decade as some futurists began to apply Ken Wilber’s integral theory and philosophy 
(e.g. Wilber, 2000, 2001, 2007a, 2007b) to futures work (e.g. Floyd & Zubevich, 2010; Slaughter, 
1998, 2004, 2008a, 2008b; Voros, 2008). It is not my intent to summarise Wilber’s work here; good 
introductions to his work include Wilber (2007b) and Wilber (2001). In essence, Wilber’s 
philosophy attempts to ‘honour all truths and acknowledge the value of many different ways of 
knowing across all significant fields’ (Slaughter, 2004, p.152). It provides a framework for 
identifying and situating multiple perspectives on the future and a map of how human interiors 
develop and unfold over time. Perhaps its key value for futurists is in identifying perspectives, and 
futures, that are currently neglected, thus opening up alternative futures for exploration and 
realisation. 
The application of Wilber’s integral theory to futures work is an ongoing project that is still 
unfolding. The previously cited special issue of Futures (Inayatullah, 2010) criticised practitioners 
of Wilberian approaches for epistemic absolutism and ideological preferencing of Wilber’s 
particular integrative approach over others. While I do not concede that this criticism is entirely 
justified, it is certain that Wilberian practitioners need to learn from the critiques and 
demonstrate sensitive and practical applications of integral theory if this theory is to provide an 
ongoing positive contribution to futures inquiry. I hope to demonstrate here that a Wilberian 
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integral futures approach can provide valuable insights into possible futures and generate 
alternative futures by drawing hidden value conflicts into the open.  
Wilber’s integral framework comprises five elements: quadrants, levels, lines, states and types. 
Slaughter (2008a) describes each of these elements and its applicability to futures work in detail. 
Here, I will draw on only two elements: quadrants and levels. 
Quadrants: four dimensions of reality 
Wilber identifies four primary dimensions of reality, emerging from two key distinctions: between 
exterior and interior perspectives (or objective and subjective perspectives); and between 
individual and collective perspectives. These twin distinctions give rise to a four quadrant model, 
shown in Figure 1. 
Intentional or psychological






















Figure 1. Wilber’s four quadrants. 
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The behavioural quadrant (upper-right in Figure 1) is concerned with the exterior of the 
individual, or the observable behaviour and structure of organisms. The social or systemic 
quadrant (lower-right) is concerned with the exterior of collectives, or the structure and dynamics 
of technological, economic, institutional and ecological systems. The intentional or psychological 
quadrant (upper-left) is concerned with the subjective interior of individuals, or self, 
consciousness, personal experiences and values. The cultural quadrant (lower left) is concerned 
with the inter-subjective interior of collectives, or culture, worldview and discourse. Integral 
theory contends that all four perspectives are needed to develop a comprehensive understanding 
of any problem or situation. Below, I use the quadrants to structure a brief initial examination of 
the visions that exist in the climate action movement. 
Levels of consciousness 
One of the key insights from earlier applications of Wilber’s work to climate change is that the 
interior quadrants – the intentional and cultural – tend to be neglected (Riedy, 2007; Slaughter, 
2009). Most proposed responses to climate change are concerned with behaviour change or 
changes to technological, economic and social systems. Very few demonstrate awareness of how 
the structure of our interior values and cultures can hinder or facilitate exterior changes (Hulme, 
2009 is a notable exception). Hence, the second key concept from integral theory that I will use in 
this paper is that there are levels of development within each quadrant and that each new level 
transcends and includes the previous level (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2009). While the evolution of 
organisms and systems is a familiar concept for most, the idea that our individual interiors and 




Developmental psychologists use many different classification schemes to identify the stages of 
interior human development but common themes are evident across these schemes (Wilber, 
2000). Here, I use a subset of the colour-coded levels of consciousness outlined by Wilber (2007a, 
2007b) as a general scheme for discussing developmental stages, as summarised in Table 1. The 
colour labels are not intended to categorise or label individuals; individuals operate from different 
levels of consciousness in different contexts and at different times, and they may exhibit different 
levels of development in different spheres, such as cognitive, emotional, moral or values spheres. 
Instead, the labels are used to conveniently represent and summarise the complexity contained in 
multiple developmental theories, such as Robert Kegan’s work on orders of consciousness (Kegan, 
1982) and Jane Loevinger and Suzanne Cook-Greuter’s work on ego development (Cook-Greuter, 
2007). Correlations between the colour labels and stages in these developmental theories are 
indicated in Table 1. Correlations with additional psychological theories are identified in Wilber 
(2000; 2007b). The selection of levels of consciousness in Table 1 is not the full spectrum 
identified by Wilber and others. I have focused on Red to Teal as these are the most prevalent 
levels of consciousness in adult populations (Brown & Riedy, 2006; Cook-Greuter, 2007) and the 
most likely to be engaged in the climate action movement. There are stages prior to Red and 
following Teal in many developmental theories, including Kegan’s and Cook-Greuter’s. 
After examining diverse climate movement visions from the perspective of each quadrant, I will 
use the levels of consciousness to explore the sources of some of the key differences that are 













Red (egocentric) Egocentric 
(me) 
It’s a jungle out there, only the 
strong survive and I do what I 
have to so I can get what I 
want 






authoritarian, my group is 
united by belief and higher 
principles, I submit to the will 
of the group, obey its rules and 
do my duty in anticipation of 
future reward 





Rational, strategic, modern, 
striving to win in a competitive 
marketplace, we can find 
solutions if we plan and 
innovate 




(all of us) 
Pluralistic, egalitarian, 
ecological, we are part of an 
interconnected web of life, we 
need to give recognition to 
diverse perspectives and seek 
consensus 









worldviews and sees that some 
are more inclusive than others, 
seeks out multiple perspectives 
as a source of creativity, 
comfortable with chaos and 
working with complex systems 








Visions of the climate action movement from four perspectives 
Behavioural visions 
Applying a behavioural perspective to climate movement visions means examining what type of 
behaviours the climate movement is advocating to bring about a desired future. There are two 
immediate distinctions that become apparent. First, participants in the climate action movement 
identify behaviour by different key actors as critical for an effective response to climate change. 
One way that this manifests is in disputes between those focused on political lobbying and those 
focused on building popular movements. For example, in a recent review of climate blogger Joe 
Romm’s book Straight Up, Bill McKibben (2010) writes: 
In fact, my main dispute with Romm’s work is his relentless focus on Washington…He’s paid less 
attention to the emerging popular movement on climate change than to the machinations of the 
Senate, but if we’re actually going to get change on the scale we need, it’s quite possible it won’t 
happen without an aggressive, large, and noisy movement demanding that change...[M]ost of the D.C. 
green movement has pretty much written off organizing out in the hinterlands in favor of lobbying in 
the offices of senators and congressmen. 
The second distinction relates to the type of behaviour that is advocated, which may include 
consumption of ‘green’ products, protest and civil disobedience, political advocacy, different 
voting behaviours, investment in low-carbon technologies or local self-sufficiency behaviours, to 
name a few. Emerging from this second distinction, a key point of contention for the movement is 
whether an effective response to climate change requires radical changes in behaviours and 
lifestyles or tweaking and redirection of existing behaviours and lifestyles. Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger (2009, p.16) argue that ‘the shift we must make does not require a transformation of 
our hearts, minds and lifestyles, but rather of the underlying technologies that power our 
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civilization’. In contrast, Crompton and Thøgersen (2009, p.141)contend that the ‘comfortable 
perception that global environmental challenges can be met through marginal lifestyle changes 
no longer bears scrutiny’.  
Systemic visions 
A systemic perspective draws attention to movement visions of a desirable future climate system 
and the technological, economic and institutional systems required to realise those desirable 
futures. Desirable technological responses to climate change are hotly contested. While there is 
widespread support within the movement for renewable energy generation and for technological 
responses that improve energy efficiency, some advocate more controversial technological 
responses such as nuclear power, carbon capture and storage, and geoengineering. For example, 
James Lovelock argues that the urgency of climate change response is such that there is no time 
to experiment with emerging forms of alternative energy and we need to immediately turn to 
nuclear power to meet our energy needs (Lovelock, 2006). Many in the movement strongly 
disagree, citing the risks and expense of nuclear power as key objections. Similarly, some 
movement participants advocate carbon capture and storage technologies (e.g. WWF, 2007), 
while others seek a future in which both nuclear power and fossil fuels are completely phased out 
(e.g. Greenpeace International & EREC, 2010). 
The movement also disagrees on how technological and other responses to climate change should 
be supported and stimulated. While many advocate carbon pricing, either through taxation or 
emission trading schemes, some prefer direct government investment in clean energy 
technologies to bring down their costs (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2009). Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger (2009) argue that politicians will always seek to set carbon prices low enough to 
avoid public unrest due to rising energy bills, and that these low prices are not sufficient to 
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stimulate the necessary technological revolution. It is better, they argue, to invest directly in 
technological innovation and to avoid targets and trading schemes. 
Another point of disagreement relates to the form of international governance and decision-
making in relation to climate change response. While there is widespread agreement that existing 
governance structures are inadequate, diverse proposed responses include eco-localism (i.e. 
shifting the locus of decision-making back towards local communities), continued pursuit of a 
legally binding treaty under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
pursuit of other multilateral agreements (e.g. the Copenhagen Accord or commitments through 
the Group of Twenty (G-20)) and establishment of a World Parliament of representatives elected 
by the people of the world. I will return to the issue of governance later in the paper. 
Even if the movement could agree on what kind of technological, economic and institutional 
responses are appropriate, it lacks a consensus view on the climatic conditions that should 
constitute the endpoint of climate action. Some movement participants argue that it is sufficient 
to limit temperature rises to no more than 2°; others argue for no more than 1.5°; and some argue 
that existing temperature rise is already unacceptable and the climate system needs to be 
returned to its pre-industrial state. I will explore the basis for this fundamental disagreement in 
more detail later in the paper. 
Cultural visions 
A cultural perspective focuses attention on the discourses, narratives and myths of climate 
change. Hulme (2009) explores a cultural perspective in great detail and shows the many different 
ways in which climate discourses can be characterised. For example, Hulme (2009) identifies four 
shared narratives about climate change: 
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• Lamenting Eden, where climate change is a departure from an imagined wild and natural 
state and the vision is for a return to that state 
• Presaging Apocalypse, where climate change brings doom and disaster upon humanity and 
we need to mobilise urgently to respond 
• Constructing Babel, in which humanity triumphs over climate change and masters the 
climate system through our ingenuity and technology 
• Celebrating Jubilee, in which climate change is an idea around which pre-existing concerns 
for environmental and social justice can be mobilised. 
All of these cultural narratives are evident in the climate action movement and they support very 
different visions of the future. For example, a vision drawing on the Constructing Babel narrative 
would define success as transformation of the technological system to deliver a low-carbon 
economy, with little concern for questions of justice and redistribution of wealth. In contrast, a 
vision drawing on Celebrating Jubilee would require global inequity to be addressed as part of the 
response to climate change and might be based around the principle of equal future rights to the 
atmosphere. 
A cultural perspective also draws attention to theories of cultural change that exist within the 
movement. There is a cultural divide between those who see the pathway to cultural change as 
one of grassroots action, protest and civil disobedience and those who see political strategy, 
lobbying and advocacy as the best way to bring about change. As identified by Dahle (2007), the 
key cultural differences are centred on whether change requires reform or revolution, whether 
change will be top-down or bottom-up and whether change can be achieved now or only after 
ecological or social collapse. 
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Many movement visions are largely devoid of any cultural vision. For example, Beyond Zero 
Emissions recently released a detailed plan to shift Australia to a zero carbon economy by 2020 
(Beyond Zero Emissions, 2010), in which there was almost no mention of the political and cultural 
changes required to realise such a vision. There is an implied vision of an unchanged culture that 
adopts systemic responses to climate change without any shift in cultural narratives or values. 
Given the evidence for significant cultural barriers to adoption of alternative energy sources (e.g. 
Sovacool, 2009), the omission of any vision for cultural change is unfortunate. 
Psychological visions 
A psychological perspective focuses attention on movement values and theories about how 
individuals can be motivated to take action to respond to climate change. A key distinction here is 
between those who argue that values are either fixed or do not need to change and those who 
argue that transformation of values is essential. For the former, the most effective way to motivate 
people to take action is to employ motivational messages that resonate with existing values. This 
kind of approach, typical of social marketing, attempts to identify existing values and to come up 
with communications that resonate with those values (e.g. DEFRA, 2008; Futerra, 2009). If most 
people are individualistic and materialistic, then the challenge is to find types of action that can 
deliver financial gains or improvements in individual status, such as improving energy efficiency, 
or purchasing highly-visible solar panels or hybrid cars. This approach does not seek to question 
values but takes them as given. As Crompton and Kasser (2009, p.2) put it, the assumption is that 
‘environmental campaigners cannot afford to be precious about the reasons that motivate 
individuals to adopt behaviour changes’. Implicit in this view is that the scale of change required 
to respond to climate change is consistent with existing values. 
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The alternative view is that climate change response requires more radical changes to individual 
lifestyles and social and cultural practices that challenge existing values. This means that new 
values will need to emerge as part of an effective response to climate change. Many within the 
climate action movement therefore include new values as part of their visions of the future. For 
example, Crompton and Kasser (2009, p.5) propose an approach called identity campaigning that 
seeks to connect with, support and activate intrinsic values including ‘the pursuit of self-
acceptance (trying to grow as a person), affiliation (having good interpersonal relationships) and 
community feeling (trying to make the broader world a better place)’. People operating from 
these values are more likely to be self-motivated to respond to climate change. 
Others within the climate action movement promote broad visions of new ecological values. The 
proposal of a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth by the World People’s 
Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth (http://pwccc.wordpress.com/) is 
a recent attempt to provide a framework for these broader values. 
 
The four perspectives discussed above give just a taste of the many points of diversity and 
difference within the visions advocated by participants in the climate action movement. In the 
next section, I will use the concept of levels of consciousness to explore the sources of some of 
these points of contestation in more detail. 
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Using depth to explore contested visions 
What is a safe climate? 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has as its objective the 
prevention of ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’. Responding to this 
language, Spratt and Sutton (2008) introduced the notion of a safe climate as the desired 
endpoint of climate action. Spratt and Sutton’s (2008) vision of a safe climate is one in which 
global average temperatures and atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions return 
to the levels that prevailed prior to the Industrial Revolution. Based on their reading of the 
science, the global climate system is sufficiently sensitive to perturbation that the risks associated 
with any significant increases in greenhouse gas emissions and global average temperatures from 
the stable conditions of the last 10,000 years are unacceptable. 
However, Spratt and Sutton’s (2008) vision of what constitutes a safe climate is not universally 
shared. The complexity of the climate system and the degree of uncertainty about future 
developments is such that climate science is unable to provide a definitive statement about the 
level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that can be considered safe. There are particular 
uncertainties about how sensitive the climate system is to different levels of human greenhouse 
gas emissions, how much warming would be sufficient to trigger positive feedback loops in the 
climate system and how different levels of warming translate into impacts on human 
infrastructure and ecological systems. 
In situations where this kind of uncertainty exists, responses are influenced by how individuals 
perceive, assess and manage risks. Risk is socially constructed and different people and groups 
form very different positions on how risk should be managed (Adams, 1995; Hulme, 2009). One 
way to categorise risk perceptions is using grid-group cultural theory, which links risk perception 
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to different myths of nature. Grid-group cultural theory identifies four distinct ways of life and 
Hulme (2009, pp.189-190) outlines how each views the climate system: 
• Fatalists see nature as capricious and believe that outcomes are a function of chance. This 
group ‘sees the climate system as fundamentally unpredictable, influenced by a 
multiplicity of factors of which humans are but one’. They argue that we cannot hope to 
control the climate or manage the risks it presents. 
• Hierarchists see nature as tolerant within limits but perverse outside those limits. This 
group seeks greater knowledge and predictive capability so that humans can identify the 
limits of the climate system and manage the system so that those limits are not exceeded. 
• Individualists see nature as benign. From this perspective, ‘risks introduced by climate 
change are viewed as manageable and, even with humans altering the global atmosphere, 
the Earth’s climate will re-establish itself at a tolerable and non-dangerous level’. 
• Egalitarians see nature as ephemeral, ‘existing in a precarious and delicate state of 
balance’. In this view, the ‘slightest perturbance by humanity can trigger a collapse in the 
system’ and the ‘risks of climate change are frightening and may spiral out of control’. 
The important insight provided by integral theory is that these differing perceptions of risk are 
associated with different levels of consciousness. In earlier work (Riedy, 2008), I showed that the 
categories identified by grid-group cultural theorists closely correspond to the distinct levels of 
consciousness in Table 1. The nature of the alignment is summarised in Table 2, which also shows 
the myth of nature associated with each level and the corresponding vision of a safe climate. Grid-
group cultural theory does not identify a way of life consistent with the Teal level of 
consciousness, however I have proposed a myth of nature and a vision of a safe climate consistent 





Way of life 
(grid-group 
cultural theory) 
Myth of nature Vision of a safe climate 
Red Fatalist Nature is a lottery, 
capricious 
There is no safe climate, we are 
always at risk and the climate 
system is beyond our control 
Amber Hierarchist Nature is tolerant if 
treated with care 
(but perverse if not) 
We can manage the threat of 
climate change by limiting 
temperature rise to x degrees, 
based on expert predictions 
Orange Individualist Nature is benign, 
forgiving and 
resilient 
The climate system will remain 
safe within broad limits, we will 
develop new technologies and 
adaptation strategies to keep it 
that way 
Green Egalitarian Nature is 
ephemeral and 
unforgiving 
The only safe climate is the one 
that existed prior to the Industrial 
Revolution 
Teal No correlation Nature can be all of 
the above, in 
different contexts 
Visions of a safe climate are plural 
and acceptable risk needs to be 
negotiated through public debate 
Table 2: Level of consciousness, risk perception and visions of a safe climate. 
Examples of most of these visions can be readily found in the climate action movement, with the 
exception of the Red vision, as people that believe there is no way we can control the climate do 
not tend to engage in climate action. 
The Amber vision of managing climate change by limiting temperature rises to a level deemed 
acceptable is very common in the climate action movement globally and most prevalent in 
governments, faith-based organisations and some of the larger, corporate environmental NGOs. 
For example, the WWF Australia website (WWF Australia, 2010) states: 
Stay under a global average temperature increase of 2 degrees Celsius...Scientists and some 
governments agree that an average global warming of 2 degrees or more above the pre-industrial level 
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would result in dangerous and irreversible climate change with dramatic social, economic and 
environmental impacts. 
The precise degree of acceptable warming varies. For example, the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) calls for ‘global average surface temperature increases to be limited to well below 1.5° C 
above pre-industrial levels’ (AOSIS, 2009). Others in the movement are shifting to this position in 
response to emerging scientific evidence that the climate system is more sensitive to greenhouse 
gas emissions than previously realised. For some, particularly in faith-based organisations, the 
Amber level of consciousness is expressed through a principle-based vision of stewardship of the 
Earth rather than through specific temperature limits.1 
The Orange level of consciousness is expressed within the climate action movement in visions 
that avoid statements about limits on emissions and temperature rise, focusing instead on 
positive visions of economic prosperity and green jobs through low carbon technologies. The New 
Apollo Program in the United States is a good example that focuses on five key initiatives: rebuild 
America clean and green; make it in America; restore America’s technological leadership; tap the 
productivity of the American people; and reinvest in America (Apollo Alliance 2008, pp.4-5). 
Orange visions are less prevalent in the climate action movement, most likely because people 
operating from that level of consciousness are often more focused on material success and less 
likely to think the safety of the climate system is under real threat. 
The Green level of consciousness is evident in Spratt and Sutton’s (2008) vision of a safe climate 
presented earlier. Safe Climate Australia argues that ‘we are already above safe levels of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and so our strategic aim should be “zero human induced 
                                                     
1 See The Climate Institute (2006) for examples from Australian religious leaders. 
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warming”’ (Safe Climate Australia, 2009, p.3). Safe Climate Australia’s vision is to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions to zero and then to draw down excess greenhouse gas from the 
atmosphere using land management and biomass processing to eventually return the climate 
system to its pre-industrial state. Similarly, in his new book Eaarth, Bill McKibben (2010b) argues 
that we are already living on an unsafe planet that has passed critical tipping points. Based on my 
personal experience working with the climate action movement in Australia and internationally, 
the Green vision is the most prevalent in the climate action movement today, particularly in the 
grassroots climate action movement. 
Teal visions are more difficult to find in the climate action movement but Hulme (2009, pp.104-
105) offers an excellent example when writing about the co-production of scientific knowledge 
and policy: 
The way to consider dangerous climate change under this model of science-policy interactions would 
be to invite open consultation across society about what dimensions of risk actually matter to the 
public, to invite experts to assess and contribute what is known about the risks of different levels of 
climate change, and to require politicians and policy makers to argue and negotiate in public about 
what level of risk is intolerable and to set policy accordingly. 
Here, we see openness to plural visions of what might constitute a safe climate and a commitment 
to participatory processes that can navigate complexity and plurality to arrive at a decision about 
how to act. This is typical of the Teal level of consciousness. However, also typical of Teal 
consciousness is the ability to translate messages to resonate with other value stages, so many 
within the climate action movement may be working from Teal consciousness but expressing 
themselves using language associated with other value stages. Further qualitative research would 
be necessary to investigate this possibility. 
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What should we do to bring about a safe climate? 
As well as helping to delineate distinct visions of a safe climate, the levels of consciousness help to 
characterise differing visions of how we should act to bring about a safe climate. Table 3 
summarises visions of the path to a safe climate associated with different levels of consciousness, 
focusing on three specific elements of such visions: climate governance, theories of social change 
and theories of personal change. To some degree these depictions are sketches or caricatures; the 
real positions advocated by movement participants are more complex and may combine multiple 
elements. Nor are the visions presented here exhaustive. Nevertheless, this characterisation does 
help to delineate key sources of difference within the movement. I have excluded the Red level of 
consciousness as people operating predominantly from this level do not believe a safe climate is 
possible and consequently see no pathway towards such a climate.  
Level of 
consciousness 




Amber Environmental authoritarianism, 
where elites within national 
governments and the United 
Nations are trusted to get on with 
the job of managing the climate 
based on expert advice 
Top-down, existing 
institutional 
structures are largely 
conserved 
No shift in values 
required, 
individuals will 





Orange Governments to provide the 
framework and rules for market-
led solutions, such as emissions 
trading and green consumption 
Commodify carbon 
to harness business 
innovation, Green 
consumerism 
(shopping our way 
out of climate 
change), reform 
existing institutions 




to price signals and 
act on their own 
ethical imperatives 
Green Eco-localism (i.e. a network of 
diverse, grassroots responses) 
and/or reform of the UNFCCC 
system to better represent and 
Activism to bring 
about radical, 
revolutionary shifts 
Work together in 
supportive groups, 




respond to global diversity in society values 
Teal A flexible system of multiple, 
scale-appropriate governance 
structures, from local to global. 
Effective action is prioritised over 
idealised agreements, whether 
through multilateral processes, 
smaller country groupings (i.e. 
minilateralism), business 
initiatives or civil society action. 
Complex and chaotic, 
punctuated 
equilibrium, you 
never know when 
rapid change will 
become possible so 
need to be ready 
Tailor motivational 
strategies and 
messages to reach 
multiple values 
Table 3: Levels of consciousness and visions of the paths to a safe climate. 
Although space does not permit detailed justification and explanation of the visions presented in 
Table 3, I will provide a brief commentary below. The Amber vision of pathways to a safe climate 
involves top-down reform of existing institutional structures to create new rules and regulations 
to constrain greenhouse gas emissions. The vision is essentially conservative, with no radical 
institutional changes and no need for individuals to shift their values. However, in extreme forms 
this vision can be expressed as a desire for environmental authoritarianism. For example, James 
Lovelock recently argued that to deal with climate change it ‘may be necessary to put democracy 
on hold for a while’ (Hickman, 2010). While Lovelock’s vision is an extreme one, the Amber vision 
does generally imply a ceding of authority to elites and scientific experts, even if these elites are 
democratically elected. 
The Orange vision of pathways to a safe climate characteristically focuses on market-led 
solutions, such as emission trading schemes and carbon taxation, as well as direct investment in 
technological solutions. In this vision, the role of governments is to establish the rules and 
frameworks of new markets and then to leave it to markets (and producers and consumers) to 
respond appropriately. This is essentially a vision of commodification of greenhouse gas 
emissions, creating opportunities to profit from a new, low-carbon economy. Once carbon is 
appropriately priced, businesses will shift to production of low-carbon products and services and 
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consumers will respond to price signals and favour low-carbon products and services. This vision 
does not foresee radical change of institutional structures or values. Rather, it proposes reform of 
the existing capitalist economy to include the externality of greenhouse gas emissions.  
Green visions of the pathway to a safe climate contemplate more radical departure from existing 
institutional structures and governance systems. While these visions can take multiple forms, a 
key distinction is between those who advocate eco-localism and those who advocate new forms of 
global governance. The former view is expressed by numerous Transition Initiatives and local 
climate action groups that have emerged around the world. A ‘Transition Initiative (which could 
be a town, village, university or island etc) is a community-led response to the pressures of 
climate change, fossil fuel depletion and increasingly, economic contraction’ (Transition Network, 
2010). Transition Initiatives seek to relocalise ‘all essential elements that a community needs to 
sustain itself and thrive’ as a response to peak oil and climate change (Brangwyn & Hopkins, 2008, 
p.7). For the Transition Movement and similar initiatives, the pathway to an effective response to 
climate change lies with a shift in the locus of decision-making towards local communities. At its 
extreme, this eco-localism is expressed through anarchist philosophies that see no role for the 
State or other authoritarian structures in climate change response (e.g. Jasiewicz, 2008). 
Whereas the eco-localism movement seeks a shift in power from nation states back to local 
communities, an alternative Green vision advocates a shift in power upwards to a global scale: 
coherent and timely responses lie beyond the grasp of our myopic and disputatious state-centric 
political order. Closing this perilous gap between obsolete geo-politics and emerging geo-realities 
delineates an urgent political endeavour: constructing a legitimate and effective system of world 
governance (Raskin & Xercavins, 2010, p.1). 
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There are multiple visions of what constitutes an effective system of world governance and how it 
could be brought about. For some, the solution is a form of direct citizen representation at the 
global level, such as a World Parliament (Raskin & Xercavins, 2010). For others, there is scope to 
reform the United Nations and the Framework Convention on Climate Change to improve 
accountability to diverse people and nation states around the world. 
In both of these Green visions, change is secured through activism and advocacy by concerned 
individuals to force radical shifts in the direction of society. The vision is one of activists working 
together in supportive groups based on shared values. In this vision, it is assumed that most 
people hold ecological values, although these may be latent. The movement grows by activating 
ecological values in the wider population and recruiting people that hold these values into the 
movement. 
I will discuss the final set of visions in Table 3, associated with the Teal level of consciousness, in 
the next section. 
Exploring climate movement futures 
The discussion so far demonstrates the breadth of visions within the climate action movement 
and shows that at least some of the observed differences are associated with differing levels of 
consciousness. Through an ongoing political process, individuals and groups advocate their 
visions and seek to promote them as desirable futures, within and beyond the climate action 
movement. Given the evident diversity of these visions and their relationship to levels of 
consciousness, it is not surprising that the movement is unable to agree on its objectives or how 
to achieve them. 
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The visions that I have reviewed here constitute a selection of possible futures that the climate 
action movement has identified and is attempting to realise. Discerning probable futures from 
this diversity is difficult, however integral theory provides valuable guidance here. Wilber (2000, 
p.137) contends that it is only with the emergence of the Green level of consciousness that 
individuals begin to care deeply about global environmental problems: 
Gaia’s main problem is that not enough human beings have developed to the postconventional, 
worldcentric, global levels of consciousness, wherein they will automatically be moved to care for the 
global commons. 
Although I have identified visions within the climate action movement that are associated with 
other levels of consciousness, it is those associated with Green or later levels of consciousness that 
predominate. People operating from the Green level of consciousness are the originators and 
driving force of the climate action movement, driven by ecological values and a deep sense of 
awareness of global connectedness and the potential impacts of climate change on people and 
ecosystems. The existence of diverse visions within the climate action movement is actually a 
measure of the success of the movement in broadening its constituency beyond the Green level of 
consciousness and finding ways to translate its concerns into terms that can be readily 
incorporated into discourse associated with, particularly, the Amber and Orange levels of 
consciousness. 
However, this process of translation has been largely unconscious because a key characteristic of 
the Green level of consciousness (and all preceding levels) is that it is unaware of the existence of 
values other than its own (Wilber, 2000). Thus, people operating from the Green level of 
consciousness assume that others share their values and will be convinced to act by the same 
arguments. This stymies strategic attempts to develop arguments and messages that appeal to 
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people holding different values. Further, Green values are often expressed as a negation of Amber 
and Orange values – what the movement is against – rather than a positive vision of what the 
movement is for. This is not a stance designed to engage those holding Amber and Orange values, 
as it immediately places their values under attack. 
A likely future, then, is one in which Green values continue to dominate the climate action 
movement and the movement continues to insist on urgent and radical changes to respond to 
climate change, in line with ecological concerns. The movement will continue to be resisted by 
mainstream political institutions dominated by Amber and Orange values, so that climate change 
response will always fall short of what the movement desires. The climate action movement is 
likely to amass increasing political power over time as more people gravitate to Green values, but 
the dominance of these values will marginalise the other values that exist within the movement 
and movement power will develop too slowly to deliver the kinds of responses that the movement 
desires. 
An alternative future, and one that I think is more desirable, is evident in the visions associated 
with the Teal level of consciousness. The Teal level of consciousness is the first that no longer 
exclusively identifies with any particular perspective (Esbjörn-Hargens & Zimmerman, 2009). 
Thus, people operating from the Teal level of consciousness recognise that others have diverse 
visions, values and perspectives and that they will consequently have different motivations for 
responding to climate change. People operating from the Teal level of consciousness can 
consciously work to identify arguments and messages that will appeal to all of the different levels 
of consciousness, thereby broadening the potential reach of the climate action movement and 
increasing the likelihood of an effective response to climate change.  
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I have outlined the elements of the Teal vision in Table 2 and Table 3. In essence, Teal recognises 
that urgency must be balanced with pragmatism and that positive social change can only be 
achieved by respecting and including people holding multiple values. Effective action is 
prioritised over any ideological commitment to particular governance structures and action is 
pursued across multiple scales, from local to global. The Teal level of consciousness is comfortable 
with the apparent chaos of current climate change response, recognising that society is in a 
process of experimenting with diverse possible responses to find out what works. Teal seeks to 
construct arguments, messages and initiatives that will appeal to multiple values and broaden the 
coalition of actors participating in the movement. For example, it reaches out to Red with images 
of mobilising for a war against climate change, to Amber by appealing to principles of Earth 
stewardship, to Orange with the lure of climate prosperity and to Green by highlighting impacts 
on people and ecosystems. Perhaps the strongest hope for a more effective future for the climate 
action movement is for more of the movement leadership to become aware of the multiple values 
and perspectives that exist within society and to begin to consciously design political strategies to 
recruit people holding these values into the movement. There may already be leaders within the 
movement that are adopting such an approach and this would be a worthy topic for further 
research. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have attempted to demonstrate the value of a Wilberian integral futures approach 
for understanding possible, probable and preferable futures in situations where diverse 
perspectives are at play. I have drawn on two specific elements of Wilber’s integral theory – 
quadrants and levels of consciousness. A quadrant scan gives an internally consistent and 
comprehensive structure for identifying the multiple dimensions of an issue. It is valuable for 
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identifying possible futures stemming not just from exterior trends but from interior trends. The 
Wilberian approach is not the only futures approach that draws attention to interiors; other 
methods, such as causal layered analysis (Inayatullah, 1998) and a broader group of integral 
futures approaches (Inayatullah, 2010) can deliver similar insights.  
Where I believe the Wilberian integral futures approach delivers unique value is in using the 
concept of levels of consciousness to provide a structure for exploring the value commitments 
that underlie different futures. The different levels of consciousness draw attention to deep 
sources of conflict and provide foci for identifying multiple possible futures. Importantly, the 
developmental relationship between the levels of consciousness supports specific exploration of 
futures that might emerge as people shift between levels. The notion of interior development 
helps futurists to locate the present moment within a process of development and understand 
likely interior trajectories, alongside exterior trajectories. 
The specific application of a Wilberian integral futures approach to the climate action movement 
reveals a movement that includes diverse values but with a heavy weighting towards Green 
values. Many in the movement remain unaware of the diverse values that exist within the 
movement and broader society, or unsure how to work with these values. The movement is 
characterised by conflicts over how to change behaviours, which technological, economic and 
institutional systems to advocate in response to climate change, how to balance urgency and 
pragmatism, whether the required change is radical or reformist and whether or not new values 
are needed to effectively respond to climate change. These debates are likely to continue and 




There are seeds of a more hopeful future emerging from movement leaders operating from a Teal 
level of consciousness. Whereas Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004) advocate the development 
and articulation of a single core set of agreed movement values, the Teal vision seeks to build 
awareness of multiple values and to develop strategies to broaden the movement by respecting 
and working with these diverse values. In support of this vision, work like Hulme’s (2009) on the 
sources of disagreement on climate change needs to be widely read and understood within the 
climate action movement, so that movement participants can recognise multiple values and 
discourses and begin to develop tailored strategies. Much more work is needed on the types of 
strategies that appeal to different levels of consciousness. The movement also needs to heed 
advice (e.g. Futerra, 2009; Steffen, 2008) about presenting positive visions of the futures that it 
advocates, rather than negative visions of the futures that it is against. 
One thing that is abundantly clear from the decades of campaigning on this issue by the climate 
action movement is that the existing approach is not delivering the response the movement is 
seeking, and the visions it is advocating are not gaining sufficiently wide attention and traction. 
New approaches are needed and one possibility is to help movement leaders to develop the ability 
to see and inhabit multiple perspectives. This can perhaps provide the starting point for a more 
inclusive climate action movement that respects and holds multiple visions as a source of strength 
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